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Abstract
Since Leeper’s (1991, Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129-147) seminal
paper, an extensive literature has argued that if fiscal policy is passive, that is,
guarantees public debt stabilization irrespectively of the inflation path, monetary
policy can independently be committed to inflation targeting. This can be pur-
sued by following the Taylor principle, i.e., responding to upward perturbations in
inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate. This
paper considers an optimizing framework in which the government can only finance
public expenditures by levying distortionary taxes. It is shown that households’
participation constraints and Laﬀer-type eﬀects may render passive fiscal policies
unfeasible. For any given target inflation rate, there exists a threshold level of
public debt beyond which monetary policy independence is no longer possible. In
such circumstances, the dynamics of public debt can be controlled only by means
of higher inflation tax revenues: inflation dynamics in line with the fiscal theory of
the price level must take place in order for macroeconomic stability to be guaran-
teed. Otherwise, to preserve inflation control around the steady state by following
the Taylor principle, monetary policy must target a higher inflation rate.
JEL Classification: E63; H31; H63.
Keywords: Public Debt; Distortionary Taxation; Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Rules.
1 Introduction
The interaction between fiscal and monetary rules is one of the most contro-
versial issues for policy design. Since Leeper’s (1991) seminal contribution,
modern theory has argued that if fiscal policy is passive, that is, guarantees
public debt stabilization irrespectively of the inflation path, monetary pol-
icy can independently be committed to inflation targeting, for example, by
managing the nominal interest rate on the basis of a Taylor-type rule (Tay-
lor, 1993). Notably, a Taylor-type rule prescribes to implement an active
monetary policy, responding to increases in inflation with a more than one-
for-one increase in the nominal interest rate (the so-called Taylor principle).
Conversely, if fiscal policy is active, that is, does not guarantee public debt
stabilization for each dynamic path of inflation, monetary policy should be
passive, responding to increases in inflation with a less than one-for-one in-
crease in the nominal interest rate in order to rule out explosive dynamics for
public debt. These results are known as Leeper’s active/passive dichotomy,
and have been proved to hold in economies with either flexible or sticky prices
(Woodford, 2003). The type of fiscal feedback rules commonly used in the
literature to model government’s policy involves the adoption of lump-sum
taxes.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that in the realistic case in
which lump-sum taxes are unavailable, it might be unfeasible to implement
passive fiscal policies. This result comes from two relevant implications of
distortionary taxes when agents optimize: (i) the emergence of households’
participation constraints; (ii) the occurrence of Laﬀer-type eﬀects generated
by both tax and interest-rate feedback rules.
The central implication of our analysis is that, for any given target infla-
tion rate, there exists a threshold level of public debt beyond which monetary
policy independence is no longer possible. Under these circumstances, the
dynamics of public debt can be controlled only by means of higher inflation
tax revenues. Specifically, two possible scenarios arise: if the central bank is
intended to preserve inflation control around the steady state by adopting the
Taylor principle, it must fix a suﬃciently higher target inflation rate; other-
wise, inflation dynamics of the type studied by the “fiscal theory of the price
level” (eg., Leeper 1991; Sims 1994; Woodford 1994, 1995, 2003; Cochrane,
1998, 2005; Leeper and Yun, 2006) must occur in order for macroeconomic
stability to be ensured.
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To illustrate our analytical results and provide transparent economic ra-
tionales, we organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we describe a
continuous-time general equilibrium optimizing framework with lump-sum
taxation and discuss the central features of Leeper’s dichotomy. A continuous-
time setup proves to be more convenient for the arguments developed in the
present paper. A discrete-time setup would not alter the essence of our
analysis, but would complicate economic intuitions, due to issues pertaining
to timing conventions.
In Sections 3-6, we remove the recourse by the government to lump-sum
taxes as an operating instrument to implement passive fiscal policies. In
Section 3, we demonstrate that a passive fiscal policy cannot be based on
a tax system that has only debt as tax base. In this case, a passive fiscal
policy violates the households’ participation constraint in the bonds market.
Such a constraint requires that the “net” interest rate is positive, a feature
that can be satisfied only by an active fiscal policy. In Section 4, we consider
the implications of using income taxes to stabilize public debt, in the simpli-
fied case of an endowment economy. Using income, as opposed to debt, as
tax base can allow to preserve monetary policy independence. The resulting
participation constraint becomes binding only for quite high levels of public
debt. In Section 5, we relax the assumption of endowment economy. We
demonstrate that there exists a lower threshold level of public debt beyond
which a passive fiscal policy is no longer feasible and monetary policy inde-
pendence disappears, due to the presence of Laﬀer eﬀects on tax revenues.
The consequences for monetary policy design are analyzed in Section 6. Our
conclusions are summarized in Section 7.
2 The basic framework
In this Section, we set up a simple continuous-time optimizing framework
with lump-sum taxation. In this context, we reconsider Leeper’s dichotomy.
In the subsequent Sections, we shall employ this model as a benchmark to
study the consequences of distortionary taxation.
2.1 Agents
Consider an endowment economy with a private sector and a public sector.
The private sector consists of a continuum of identical infinitely lived house-
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holds.1 The representative household has preferences given by the following
lifetime utility function:
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [u(c,m) + f (g)] dt, (1)
where c is real private consumption, m are real money balances, and g is real
government consumption expenditure. The instantaneous utility function
u (c,m) + f (g) is increasing in the three arguments and concave: ∂u/∂c =
uc > 0, ∂u/∂m = um > 0, df/∂g = f 0 > 0, ∂2u/∂c2 = ucc < 0, ∂2u/∂m2 =
umm < 0, d2f/dg2 = f 00 < 0. Consumption and real balances are Edgeworth
complements, so that ucm > 0.
The household’s instant budget constraint in real terms is given by
c+ b˙+ m˙ = (i− π) b+ y − τ + τh − πm, (2)
where b is the stock of interest-bearing bonds, i is the nominal interest rate
paid on bonds, π is the inflation rate, y is a constant endowment of perishable
goods, τ are lump-sum taxes, and τh are government transfers.2 The right-
hand-side of (2) represents disposable income; the left-hand-side shows the
uses of disposable income: consumption and saving; the latter takes the form
of increases in the stock of real bonds and real balances. The household is
prevented from engaging in Ponzi’s games.
The public sector’s budget constraint in real terms is given by
g + τh + (i− π) b− τ − πm = b˙+ m˙. (3)
Now, the left-hand-side of (3) represents government deficit net of inflation
tax revenues; the right-hand-side shows how the public sector can finance its
deficit: by issuing interest-bearing bonds and printing money.
1Several issues on monetary and fiscal policy design in non-Ricardian economies in
which new generations are born over time are studied by Benassy (2007).
2The budget constraint in real terms (2) is derived dividing by the price level the budget
constraint in nominal terms,
C + B˙ + M˙ = iB + Y − T + Th,
where upper-case letters represent the corresponding nominal variables. Standard algebra
leads to (2).
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2.2 Agents’ choices
The private sector chooses paths for private consumption, real balances, and
bonds so as to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the
transversality conditions, given the constant stream of the endowment y,
and the initial conditions m (0) = m0 and b (0) = b0. Optimization yields



(1) uc(c,m) = λ,
(2) um(c,m) = λi,
(3) λ˙ = λ (ρ+ π − i) .
(4)
Consistently with Leeper (1991), the choices of the public sector are described
by two rules, one pertaining to monetary policy, the other to fiscal policy.
The monetary authority fixes the nominal interest rate i in order to con-
trol the inflation rate π around the target inflation rate π∗. To facilitate the
analysis, and without loss of generality, we assume π∗ > 0. We summarize
such a feedback rule as
i = φ (π) , (5)
where φ (π) is continuous, non-decreasing, and strictly positive. Monetary
policy is defined as active when the monetary authority reacts more than
proportionally to changes in inflation, di/dπ = φ0 > 1, according to the
so-called Taylor principle. Monetary policy is defined as passive when the
opposite occurs, φ0 < 1.
Let now consider fiscal policy. Public consumption g and transfers τh are
assumed to be exogenous and constant. Taxes are described by the feedback
rule
τ = α¯+ αb, (6)
where α¯ is a constant parameter and α ≥ 0 captures the degree of reactiveness
of taxes to public debt. Fiscal policy is defined as passive when rule (6)
guarantees stability of public debt around the steady state for each dynamic
path of inflation. That is, a passive fiscal policy must respect the condition
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
< 0. (7)
Conversely, fiscal policy is defined as active when the fiscal rule (6) is such
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that
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
> 0. (8)
2.3 Equilibrium
Combining the two constraints (2) and (3), and imposing equilibrium in
the bonds and money markets, one obtains the goods’ market equilibrium
condition:
y = c+ g. (9)
Since y and g are both exogenous and constant, it follows that c˙ = 0. Thus,
from (4.1) and (4.2), we can derive the relationships between m and i, i.e.,
the money demand function, and between λ and i:3½
(1) m = m (i) with m0 < 0,
(2) λ = λ (i) with λ0 < 0. (10)
We can now derive the equation describing inflation dynamics. Time diﬀer-
entiating (10.2), using the costate equation (4.3) and the monetary policy
rule (5), we obtain
π˙ = H (π) [φ (π)− π − ρ] , (11)
where H (π) = −λ/λ0φ0 > 0.
To derive the equilibrium equation describing public debt dynamics, we
start from money demand (10.1); using the monetary policy rule (5), diﬀer-
entiating with respect to time, using the inflation dynamics equation (11),
substituting into the budget constraint (3), and taking into account the fiscal
policy rule (6), we obtain
b˙ = [φ (π)− π − α] b+ g+ τh− α¯+K (π) [φ (π)− π − ρ]−πm [φ (π)] , (12)
where K (π) = λm0/λ0 > 0.
The dynamics of the economy is described by the system of diﬀerential
equations (11) and (12) in the variables (π, b). Since the monetary authority
controls the nominal interest rate, money supply is endogenous, and adjusts
to demand. Money demand turns out to depend on the inflation rate ac-
cording to the function m [φ (π)]. The inflation rate π results to be “chosen”
3For analytical details, see Appendix A.
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indirectly by the private sector, thus being a jump variable. The level of
public debt b is instead the state variable in the system. We can then de-
fine a perfect-foresight equilibrium as a pair of functions {π (t) , b (t)} that
satisfy (11)-(12), given the initial condition b (0) = b0 and the transversality
conditions.
The system is in steady state when b˙ = 0 and π˙ = 0. From (11), the
steady-state value of inflation π∗ is implicitly defined by
φ (π∗) = ρ+ π∗. (13)
Using (13) into (12) yields the steady-state value of debt b∗:
b∗ = α¯− g − τh + π
∗m (ρ+ π∗)
ρ− α . (14)
As in Leeper (1991), the parameter α¯ is chosen to make b∗ positive, and can
be interpreted as a “scale” parameter.
The system (11)-(12) and its steady-state solution (13)-(14) enable us to
specify when fiscal policy is passive and when it is active. We must compute
the partial derivative of b˙ with respect to b, evaluated at the steady state
(π∗, b∗). If the value of this derivative is negative, fiscal policy is passive, and
viceversa. We have
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= ρ− α, (15)
Therefore, fiscal policy is passive if α > ρ. Note the economic meaning of
this condition: the implicit marginal tax rate on bonds must be greater than
the return on bonds.
2.4 Dynamics
To study the dynamics of the system (11)-(12), let linearize it around the
steady state (π∗, b∗): µ
π˙
b˙
¶
= J
µ
π − π∗
b− b∗
¶
. (16)
The Jacobian J is
J =
·
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
A21 ρ− α
¸
, (17)
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b  0

b  0
b
Figure 1: Passive fiscal policy and active monetary policy
where A21 = (b∗ +K∗) (φ0 − 1)−m∗
³
1− η∗m/π
´
, with η∗m/π = |(π∗/m∗)m0φ0|
denoting the elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation, evaluated
at (π∗, b∗).
Since b is a state variable and π a jump variable, we have a saddle path
if the following condition holds:
det J = H∗ (φ0 − 1) (ρ− α) < 0. (18)
Condition (18) is satisfied either if «α > ρ and φ0 > 1» (passive fiscal policy
and active monetary policy) or if «α < ρ and φ0 < 1» (active fiscal policy
and passive monetary policy). These are the two cases that specify Leeper’s
dichotomy. To see it at work, suppose to start from a value b0 6= b∗.
When α > ρ, the solution of the system (16) is given by½
b = b∗ + (b0 − b∗) e−(α−ρ)t,
π = π∗. (19)
Since, by assumption, fiscal policy is passive, the monetary authority is per-
fectly able to control inflation according to the Taylor principle (φ0 > 1).
The phase diagram of the system (16) is presented in Figure 1. The slope of
the locus b˙ = 0, given by (ρ− α) /A21, depends on the sign of A21 which can
be positive or negative. This is because inflation has two opposite eﬀects on
the level of public debt: on the one hand, it increases interest payments by
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the government, since, by assumption, φ0 > 1; on the other hand, it increases
inflation tax. In Figure 1, we have drawn the locus b˙ = 0 with positive slope,
as it is more likely to occur when inflation is relatively low. Nevertheless, this
slope has no relevance for the system dynamics, since in this case the saddle
path coincides with the locus π˙ = 0. Finally, equation (19) implies that the
velocity through which debt converges to the steady state is an increasing
function of α.
When α < ρ, we must have φ0 < 1 for saddle-path stability to occur. The
solution of the system (16) becomes½
b = b∗ + (b0 − b∗) eH
∗(φ0−1)t,
π = π∗ + S (φ0, α) (b− b∗) . (20)
where S (φ0, α) = −TrJ/A21 > 0 measures the slope of the saddle path,
which is greater than the slope of the locus b˙ = 0. Since now fiscal policy is
active (α < ρ), the monetary authority cannot follow the Taylor principle.
Assuming b0 > b∗, the jump in inflation above the target π∗ allows the real
public debt to decrease gradually and converge to the steady state. This is
because
∂b˙
∂π
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= A21 < 0. (21)
The intuition is as follows. Inflation decreases the real interest rate φ (π)−π,
increases inflation tax, and hence increases the monetary financing of deficit.4
The associated phase diagram is illustrated in Figure 2. The jump in inflation
needed to ensure stability of real public debt is in accordance with the so-
called “fiscal theory of the price level”.5 In synthesis, when fiscal policy is
active, inflation dynamics depends on fiscal variables.
To summarize, Leeper’s dichotomy establishes that monetary policy is
able to control inflation consistently with the target level π∗, provided that
fiscal policy takes the burden of controlling public debt. In the opposite
case, it is monetary policy that must take the burden of bringing public debt
back to the level b∗. Monetary policy can obtain this result only by allowing
inflation to jump above the level π∗ when b (t) > b∗.
4The term A21 can be decomposed in two parts. The first part is negative only when
φ0 < 1. The second part is negative if the economy is on the upward-sloping side of the
Laﬀer curve for seignorage, as it is eﬃcient.
5See Woodford (2003, pp. 311-319) for a discussion.
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Figure 2: Active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy
Thus, Leeper’s dichotomy states that a necessary condition for monetary
policy independence in the presence of public debt is that fiscal policy is pas-
sive. In the next Sections, we explore the constraints that the fiscal authority
can face in implementing a passive policy, as soon as we relax the simplified
case of lump-sum taxation.
3 Bonds taxation and the participation
constraint
We have seen that fiscal policy is passive when its primary objective is pub-
lic debt stabilization. To obtain this result, the implicit marginal tax rate α
must be greater than ρ, the steady-state real return on public bonds. This
condition raises a feasibility problem for a passive fiscal policy, which emerges
when we remove the assumption of lump-sum taxation, thus enabling opti-
mizing households to take into account the interaction between their choices
and the level of taxation.6 Intuitively, the household will never demand an
asset with a negative real return.7
6As long as taxation is lump sum and equilibrium is competitive, so that the single
household is atomistic, the exogenous parameter α does not appear in the solution of the
private agents’ maximizing problem. This is because the representative household is not
able to internalize taxation into its optimal choice.
7Money is the only exception. There can be a positive demand for money also in the
presence of a negative return due to inflation, since money has a positive marginal utility.
9
Let us analyze the argument. Suppose that fiscal policy obtains its rev-
enues by setting the nominal public debt as tax base,8 with a tax rate equal
to α. The households’ participation constraint in the bonds market imposes
α < i. (22)
We shall now show that, by rewriting the model with such a participation
constraint, fiscal policy cannot be passive.
The representative household’s instant budget constraint in real terms is
now
c+ b˙+ m˙ = (i− π − α) b+ y − α¯+ τh − πm. (23)
Performing optimization yields



(1) uc(c,m) = λ,
(2) um(c,m) = λ (i− α) ,
(3) λ˙ = λ (ρ+ π + α− i) .
(24)
The government’s budget constraint is now
g + τh + (i− π − α) b− α¯− πm = b˙+ m˙. (25)
In equilibrium, optimality conditions (24.1) and (24.2) can be written in
implicit form as follows:½
(1) m = m (i− α) with m0 < 0,
(2) λ = λ (i− α) with λ0 < 0. (26)
The closed-form diﬀerential-equation system in the variables (π, b) is then
given by
π˙ = H (π) [φ (π)− π − α− ρ] , (27)
b˙ = [φ (π)− π − α] b+ g+ τh+K (π) [φ (π)− π − α− ρ]−πm [φ (π)] . (28)
The steady-state solutions are
φ (π∗) = α+ ρ+ π∗, (29)
8It can be shown that the same argument applies by assuming taxation on real bonds,
or on nominal (or real) interest payments. For an analysis of macroeconomic stability
under Taylor rules in a New Keynesian framework with nominal interest taxation, see
Edge and Rudd (2007).
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b∗ = α¯− g − τh + π
∗m (α+ ρ+ π∗)
ρ . (30)
It immediately follows that
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= ρ. (31)
This proves that fiscal policy cannot be passive, for households internalize
bonds taxation into their optimal decisions.
The implications for monetary policy are straightforward. Now, the Ja-
cobian is
J =
·
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
A21 ρ
¸
. (32)
The emergence of a saddle path requires φ0 < 1, that is, a passive monetary
policy. The monetary authority is no longer able to control inflation.
To conclude, a passive fiscal policy cannot rely on debt taxation only.
There are two alternatives to ensure macroeconomic stability. The first is to
combine debt taxation with an inflationary path brought about by a passive
monetary policy, along the lines depicted by the fiscal theory of the price
level. But in this case, the monetary authority cannot be independent, i.e.,
cannot adopt a Taylor-type rule with φ0 > 1, in order to set inflation equal to
the target level π∗. The second alternative is to raise revenues from another
tax base.
4 Income taxation in an endowment economy
Let us focus on the implications of using income taxes as instrument of a
passive fiscal policy.9 For now, let us maintain the simplified hypothesis of
endowment economy. So the analysis of this Section is directly comparable
with Leeper’s (1991), and serves to introduce the issues addressed in the next
Section.
Let τ y < 1 be the tax rate on income. The household’s budget constraint
is given by
c+ b˙+ m˙ = (i− π) b+ (1− τ y) y + τh − πm. (33)
9Linnemann (2006) studies the dynamic eﬀects of alternative fiscal rules in a New
Keynesian model with income taxation.
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Since y is exogenous, the optimality conditions are exactly the same as in
Section 2.
The government’s budget constraint is given by
g + τh + (i− π) b− τ yy − πm = b˙+ m˙. (34)
Fiscal policy is now described in terms of a feedback rule in which income
taxation reacts to public debt:
τ yy = α¯+ αb. (35)
The diﬀerential-equation system is the same as in Section 2. Hence, using
income, as opposed of debt, as tax base allows to reestablish Leeper’s di-
chotomy, so that a passive fiscal policy allows monetary policy independence.
However, this result is subject to the following remark.
The steady-state marginal tax rate, τ ∗y, depends on the target inflation
rate π∗, independently set by the monetary authority, and on the steady-state
level of public debt b∗:
τ ∗y = ρ
b∗
y +
g + τh
y −
π∗m (ρ+ π∗)
y . (36)
From (36), the fiscal rule may violate the participation constraint, which
imposes τ y < 1. Because ∂τ ∗y/∂b∗ > 0, it emerges a limit on the level
of steady-state public debt. Let bMy be the threshold value of public debt
beyond which the participation constraint is violated. From (36), it follows
that
bMy =
y − g − τh + π∗m (ρ+ π∗)
ρ . (37)
If b0 > bMy , it is not feasible to implement a passive fiscal policy, for τ y (0) y =
α¯ + αb0 > 1, which violates the constraint τ y < 1. A central bank intended
to follow the Taylor principle has to accept a higher steady-state inflation
rate in order to raise the monetary financing, thereby ensuring b0 ≤ bMy .
The foregoing remark, it can be argued, is “purely” theoretical. The
condition b0 > bMy could be, in fact, empirically implausible. However, recall
that thus far we have assumed an endowment economy. Households’ optimal
decisions for consumption and saving do not aﬀect the level of y, thereby
not influencing fiscal revenues. Such an independence between households’
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optimal decisions and fiscal revenues no longer holds in a production economy.
We shall examine the consequences in what follows.
5 Laﬀer eﬀects and monetary policy
independence
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical household-firms.
The production technology of the representative household-firm is given by
y = l, (38)
where l represents labor supply. The household’s lifetime utility function
takes the following form:
U =
∞Z
0
e−ρt [u(c,m) + f (g)− v (l)] dt, (39)
where u (c,m) is linearly homogeneous, so that uccumm − u2cm = 0, v0 (l) > 0
and v00 (l) > 0.
Using (38), the household-firm’s flow budget constraint is given by (33),
and the optimality conditions associated with the maximization problem be-
come 


(1) uc(c,m) = λ,
(2) um(c,m) = λi,
(3) v0 (y) = λ (1− τ y) ,
(4) λ˙ = λ (ρ+ π − i) .
(40)
The government’s budget constraint is given by (34). Fiscal policy is
described by rule (35).
In equilibrium, conditions (40.1)-(40.3) can be expressed in implicit form
as10 


(1) y = y (i, τ y) with yi < 0, yτy < 0,
(2) m = m (i, τ y) with mi < 0, mτy < 0,
(3) λ = λ (i) with λ0 < 0.
(41)
10For analytical details, see Appendix B.
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Using (41.1), the fiscal policy rule takes the following form:
τ yy (i, τ y) = α¯+ αb. (42)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to time yields
τ˙ y =
α
y
³
1− ηy/τy
´ b˙− τ yyi
y
³
1− ηy/τy
´ i˙, (43)
where ηy/τy =
¯¯
(τ y/y) yτy
¯¯
denotes the elasticity of output with respect to the
marginal rate. We assume ηy/τy < 1, i.e., that the economy is on the upward-
sloping side of the Laﬀer curve, for it results to be eﬃcient. Therefore, we
can write
τ y = τ (b, i) with τ b > 0, τ i > 0. (44)
Dynamics can then be expressed in terms of the following diﬀerential-equation
system:
π˙ = H (π) [φ (π)− π − ρ] , (45)
b˙= [φ(π)−π−α] b+g+τh−α¯+K(π, b)[φ(π)−π−ρ]−πm {φ(π), τ [b, φ(π)]}
1 +mτyτ b
,
(46)
where K (π, b) = λ
¡
mi +mτyτ i
¢
/λ0 > 0.
The steady-state solutions are given by
φ (π∗) = ρ+ π∗, (47)
b∗ = α¯− g − τh + π
∗m [ρ+ π∗, τ (b∗, ρ+ π∗)]
ρ− α . (48)
It follows that
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, b∗)
= ρ− α− π∗mτyτ b
= ρ− α

1 + π
∗mτy
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´

 , (49)
where we have used the fact that, from (44) evaluated at the steady state,
τ b = α/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
.
14
To facilitate our discussion on dynamic stability, and make the present
analysis easily comparable with the results that apply in the benchmark
model of Section 2, let us restrict attention to the case in which
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
>
¯¯
π∗mτy
¯¯
. (50)
This condition simply says that the increase in fiscal revenues generated by
an increase in the tax rate is greater than the decrease in inflation tax brought
about by the associated fall in money demand. Therefore, total revenues, i.e.,
fiscal revenues plus inflation tax, are assumed to raise following an increase
in the tax rate. If condition (50) holds, then a passive fiscal policy requires
α > ρ
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´ . (51)
Since π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
< 0, the feedback parameter α must be greater
than in the endowment-economy case. The reason is clear. An increase in
public debt causes the tax rate to raise via the fiscal policy feedback rule.
The increase in the tax rate brings about a decrease in output and hence
in money demand. This crowds out inflation tax, thereby requiring a more
aggressive reaction by the fiscal authority. The foregoing mechanism implies
that the higher the elasticity of output with respect to the tax rate, the
higher parameter α ensuring a passive fiscal policy, as it is apparent from
(51).
The Jacobian is given by
J =


H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
B21 ρ− α
·
1 +
π∗mτy
y∗

1−η∗y/τy

¸  , (52)
where
B21 =
(b∗ +K∗) (φ0 − 1)−m∗
³
1− η∗m/π
´
− π∗mτyτ iφ0
1 +mτyτ b
does not aﬀect the two eigenvalues of the matrix and hence the conditions
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for saddle-path stability. The latter occurs if the following condition applies:
det J = H∗ (φ0 − 1)− ρ− α

1 + π
∗mτy
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´

 < 0. (53)
Condition (53) is verified either if
α > ρ
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´ and φ0 > 1
or if
α < ρ
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´ and φ0 < 1.
If fiscal policy is passive, i.e., α > ρ/
h
1 + π∗mτy/y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´i
, monetary
policy independence is ensured.
However, for a given target inflation rate independently set by the mone-
tary authority, the occurrence of Laﬀer-type eﬀects poses a limit on the level
of steady-state public debt. Let indicate it by bMl . We shall demonstrate that
beyond such a limit, a passive fiscal policy becomes unfeasible.
To prove this result, first notice that in the steady state it must be that
τ ∗yy
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
+ π∗m
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
= ρb∗ + g + τh. (54)
It follows that
bMl =
max
τ∗y
£
τ ∗yy
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
+ π∗m
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢¤
− g − τh
ρ . (55)
Maximization of total revenues with respect to the tax rate occurs when
y∗
³
1− η∗y/τy
´
= −π∗mτy . (56)
Since mτy < 0, total revenues are maximized on the left-hand-side of the
Laﬀer curve. This is precisely because, for a given target inflation rate,
higher tax rates generate a negative spillover on inflation tax.
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Now, substituting (56) into (49) yields
∂b˙
∂b
¯¯¯¯
¯
(π∗, bMl )
= ρ. (57)
This demonstrates our finding: if b0 > bMl , fiscal policy cannot be passive,
for total revenues cannot be suﬃcient to reduce public debt over time.
Remarkably, the presence of Laﬀer eﬀects on tax revenues causes the
threshold level of public debt to be lower with respect to the endowment-
economy case. That is, we have
bMl < bMy . (58)
A central policy implication emerges. If b0 > bMl , the dynamics of public
debt can be controlled only by means of inflation tax revenues. Monetary
policy independence is no longer possible.
6 Maximum debt, inflation targeting, and the
fiscal theory of the price level
From (55), bMl is a function of the target inflation rate π∗, bMl = bMl (π∗). To
study this function, we can apply the envelop theorem. We have
dbMl
dπ∗ =
τMyi +m∗ + π∗mi
ρ (59)
=
m∗
ρ
µ
1− η∗m/π −
τMy∗
π∗m∗η
∗
y/π
¶
,
where
τM = argmax
τ∗y
£
τ ∗yy
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢
+ π∗m
¡
ρ+ π∗, τ ∗y
¢¤
.
From (59), dbMl /dπ∗ > 0 as long as η∗m/π −
¡
τMy∗/π∗m∗
¢
η∗y/π < 1. We let
πM be the value of the inflation rate such that η∗m/π−
¡
τMy∗/π∗m∗
¢
η∗y/π = 1,
that is, dbMl /dπ∗ = 0.
Function bMl (π∗) is illustrated in Figure 3, and has the following interpre-
tation. For π∗ = 0, we have η∗m/π = η∗y/π = 0, so that dbMl /dπ∗ = m∗/ρ > 0.
As long as π∗ raises, both elasticities η∗m/π and η∗y/π increase. This is because
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blM
Figure 3: Maximum debt and inflation target
the increase in inflation causes the nominal interest rate to raise, leading to
a fall in both money demand and output. As a result, total revenues, that
is, fiscal revenues plus inflation tax, increase as long as π∗ < πM, reach a
maximum at π∗ = πM, and decrease as along as π∗ > πM. Two implications
for the design of monetary policy rules arise.
First, if the monetary authority is intended to adopt the Taylor principle
in order to maintain inflation control around the steady state, and at the same
time avoid explosive paths in public debt, it must set an inflation target such
that π∗0 ≤ π∗ ≤ πM, thereby ensuring b0 ≤ bMl .
Second, if the monetary authority sets a target inflation rate such that
π∗ < π∗0, then we have b0 > bMl , and macroeconomic stability is guaranteed
only by inflation dynamics along the lines of the fiscal theory of the price
level. In fact, the Jacobian evaluated at
¡
π∗, bMl
¢
is given by
J(π∗, bMl ) =
·
H∗ (φ0 − 1) 0
B21 ρ
¸
. (60)
Saddle-path stability requires that monetary policy is passive, φ0 < 1. Violat-
ing the Taylor principle allows the inflation rate to jump up in order to rule
out explosive dynamics in public debt. Nevertheless, in this second case the
monetary authority clearly looses inflation control around the steady state.11
11Our results also suggest that when the level of public debt is quite high, an independent
monetary policy may not be the best one because coordination issues between monetary
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7 Conclusions
Distortionary taxation has negative consequences for monetary policy inde-
pendence. It is well known, at least since the original contribution by Leeper
(1991), that inflation control by an independent monetary authority requires
a passive fiscal policy, ensuring stability of public debt for each time path of
inflation. In this paper, we have demonstrated that when only distortionary
revenue sources are available for the government, passive fiscal policies may
not be feasible. This result comes about because of both households’ partic-
ipation constraints and Laﬀer-type eﬀects. We have shown that there exists
a threshold level of public debt beyond which monetary policy independence
vanishes. We have examined the implications for policy design. The central
bank can maintain inflation control around the steady state, by applying the
Taylor principle, provided it targets a higher inflation rate. Otherwise, infla-
tion must endogenously jump up in line with the fiscal theory of the price
level.
and fiscal authorities may become relevant. Of course, when the two policies are coor-
dinated, they must be designed according to welfare considerations. Welfare-maximizing
monetary and fiscal policy rules in a model with sticky prices and distortionary taxation
are studied by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).
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Appendix A
Consider the two optimality conditions (4.1) and (4.2). Diﬀerentiating with
respect to time, recalling that c˙ = 0, we can write the results in matrix
notation: µ
ucm −1
umm −i
¶µ
m˙
λ˙
¶
= λ
µ
0
i˙
¶
. (A.1)
Let ∆ = umm − ucmi < 0. Then we have
m˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
0 −1
i˙ −i
¯¯¯¯
∆
=
λ
∆
i˙, (A.2)
λ˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
ucm 0
umm i˙
¯¯¯¯
∆
=
λucm
∆
i˙. (A.3)
We can thus write (10).
Appendix B
Consider the three optimality conditions (4.1)-(4.2). Diﬀerentiating with re-
spect to time and imposing the goods’ market equilibrium condition, we can
express the results as


ucc ucm −1
ucm umm −i
v00 0 − (1− τ y)




y˙
m˙
λ˙

 = λ


0
i˙
−τ˙ y

 . (B.1)
Let Ψ = v00 (umm − ucmi) < 0. Hence, we have
y˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 0 ucm −1i˙ umm −i
−τ˙ y 0 − (1− τ y)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
Ψ
(B.2)
=
λ (1− τ y)ucm
Ψ
i˙− λv00 τ˙ y,
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m˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ucc 0 −1ucm i˙ −i
v00 −τ˙ y − (1− τ y)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
Ψ
(B.3)
=
λ [v00 − (1− τ y)ucc]
Ψ
i˙+ λ (ucm − ucci)
Ψ
τ˙ y,
λ˙ =
λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ucc ucm 0ucm umm i˙
v00 0 −τ˙ y
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
Ψ
(B.4)
=
λv00ucm
Ψ
i˙.
We can thus write (41).
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